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THE "NEW" LAW OF MONOPOLIZATION: AN
EXAMINATION OF MCI COMMUNICATIONS CORP. V.
AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
Spencer Weber Waller*
On January 12, 1983, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit released its long-awaited opinion in MCI Communications Corp. v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.' The 128-page opinion concerns the
1974 monopolization suit brought by MCI against the alleged predatory and
exclusionary practices of AT&T during the early seventies, a period when
MCI first began to compete aggressively with AT&T in the private line long-
distance telecommunications market. In a two-to-one decision, a panel of
the Seventh Circuit reversed a $1.8 billion judgment award against AT&T
while rejecting allegations that AT&T had engaged in predatory pricing.2
The court, however, affirmed most of the findings of liability against AT&T
and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages. 3 While a
plethora of issues was addressed in the opinion,4 both the majority and
the dissenting opinions concentrated on the predatory pricing claims of MCI
and on the proof and calculation of damages. This article therefore limits
its analysis to these critical issues and briefly addresses the application of
the essential facilities doctrine to AT&T's refusal to interconnect MCI with
the Bell System.
I. PREDATORY PRICING
A. Price-Cost Comparisons as a Measure of Predation
Allegations of predatory pricing have played an increasingly prominent
role in antitrust cases over the past eight years,' yet court decisions remain
* Trial Attorney, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice. B.A., Univer-
sity of Michigan; J.D., Northwestern University. The views expressed in this article are solely
those of the author and are not intended to reflect the views of the Antitrust Division.
1. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3280-81 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1983)
(Nos. 83-21, 83-32, 83-217). Hereinafter the parties will be abbreviated as "MCI" and "AT&T."
2. Id. at 1111-15, 1161-66.
3. Id. at 1131-44, 1145-47, 1150-53, 1166-69.
4. Aside from the predatory pricing and damages issues, the opinion also addresses anti-
trust immunity, id. at 1101-05, federal and state regulation of the telecommunications industry,
id. at 1105-11; the essential facilities doctrine, id. at 1132-33; tying, id. at 1144; the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, id. at 1153-59; and pre-announcement of new prices and services by a
monopolist, id. at 1128-30.
5. For appendices listing predation cases reported between 1976 and 1982, see Calvani
and Lynch, Predatory Pricing Under the Robinson-Patman & Sherman Acts: An Introduction,
51 ANTrrRUST L.J. 375, 399 (1982); Hurwitz and Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The
Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REV. 63, 151 (1982).
Many forms of predation are possible, see, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
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inconclusive as to what constitutes unlawful predatory practices. In a ground-
breaking article, Professors Areeda and Turner proposed a uniform stan-
dard for analyzing claims of predatory pricing: allegations of predatory pric-
ing should be judged solely by comparing a defendant's prices with the
marginal cost of producing the goods or services in question.6 According
to Areeda and Turner, proof of pricing below marginal cost, or below average
variable cost as a proxy,7 would be conclusive evidence of unlawful preda-
tion, while proof of pricing at or above average variable cost would establish
the legality of the defendant's pricing policies.'
The courts and commentators have split into three main camps over the
validity of the rule proposed by Areeda and Turner. A significant number
of courts have adopted, with varying degrees of reservation, the Areeda-
Turner average variable cost rule for judging predation.9 Other courts and
commentators have sought to measure predation by using different cost-based
standards,'" while still others have rejected the Areeda-Turner rule for a wider
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (claims of predation involving
product innovation). The most prevalent allegations, however, concern predatory pricing. See
Calvani & Lynch, supra, at 399; Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra, at 151.
6. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1975). Areeda and Turner's article analyzes both the marginal
cost, which is defined as the incremental increase in total cost resulting from production of
an additional unit of output, and the average total cost, which focuses on the sum of fixed
and variable costs divided by the number of units of output, as possible measures of predatory
pricing. The authors conclude that marginal cost is more relevant to predatory pricing analysis
because it is this incremental measure of costs to which a firm looks when it seeks to maximize
profits or minimize losses. Id. at 701-02; see infra note 8.
7. Average variable cost is the sum of those costs which vary with changes in output over
the short run, divided by the number of units of output. Areeda and Turner conclude that
average variable cost, though often a different figure than marginal cost, may be useful as
a substitute for marginal cost in predatory pricing analysis because a firm's marginal cost may
be difficult to ascertain from general business accounting data. Areeda & Turner, supra note
6, at 716.
8. Id. at 709-13. Areeda and Turner find pricing at or above average variable cost to
be legitimate competitive pricing and thus non-predatory. Id. at 704-09. Similarly, they con-
sider pricing at or above marginal cost to be non-predatory because the alternative would per-
mit the entry of inefficient firms, waste economic resources, and create administrative prob-
lems in enforcement. Id. at 711. Nevertheless, Areeda and Turner find pricing below marginal
cost to be predatory because such a pricing scheme wastes social resources and greatly increases
the possibility that competitors will be extinguished. Id. at 712.
9. See 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1711 (1982); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427,
431 (7th Cir. 1980); Americana Indus. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 556 F.2d 624, 628
(1st Cir. 1977); see also Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1981) (identifying the need for a marginal cost methodology in analyzing predatory pric-
ing), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1438 (1982).
10. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,
1034 n.29 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff may prove that prices above average variable cost are predatory
if such prices are below defendant's short-run profit maximizing price and if the barriers to
market entry are great), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 58 (1982); International Air Indus. v. American
Excelsion Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 1975) (damage to competition will not be inferred
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ranging inquiry into the defendant's intent."
The Seventh Circuit previously addressed the Areeda-Turner position in
Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp. 2, where the court
affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant because of the plaintiff's failure
to prove that the defendant's prices were below average variable cost.' 3
Although the court found that the Areeda-Turner rule was "a relevant and
extremely useful factor in determining the presence of predatory conduct,"
the court expressed a willingness to consider other unspecified factors in
analyzing predatory pricing claims."
Thus, the Seventh Circuit in MCI was not approaching the issue of
predatory pricing with an entirely clean slate. The situation presented to the
court in MCI, however, forced an analysis of the predatory pricing issue
in a new light. While the debate over the validity of the Areeda-Turner rule
generally was concerned with the choice between using average variable costs
or average total costs,'I neither party in MCI phrased its arguments in these
terms. Rather, MCI argued that AT&T was guilty of predatory pricing
because it had priced its long-distance business telephone services below fully
distributed cost ("FDC")' 6 with the intent to injure MCI. AT&T responded
that its pricing policies should be presumed lawful unless MCI proved that
its prices were below long-run incremental cost ("LRIC").' 7 The parties'
choices of cost standards were dictated by the availability of the evidence
from pricing below average variable cost if the effect is either beneficial or insignificant), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). See generally Note, Predatory Pricing: The Retreat From the
AVC Rule and the Search for a Practical Alternative, 22 B.C.L. REV. 467 (1981).
11. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir. 1983); see
L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 108-13 (1977); Dirlam, Marginal Cost Pricing Tests for Predation:
Naive Welfare Economics and Public Policy, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 769, 799-811 (1981); Sullivan,
Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1229-31 (1977).
12. 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980) (a small producer of road gravel charged its competitor,
a large, diversified company, with predatory pricing in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act).
13. Id. at 432.
14. Id.
15. Average total cost is the sum of all costs (fixed and variable), divided by the number
of units of output. Average variable cost is the sum of those costs which vary with changes
in output over the short run, divided by the number of units of output. The court in MCI
discusses these and other measures of cost. 708 F.2d at 1114-18; see supra notes 6-7.
16. Fully distributed cost is defined as the average additional cost per unit of adding a
new product or service to a preexisting line, which includes a portion of the firm's unallocable
overhead assigned to the new product or service. Fully distributed cost is used most often in
regulatory rate-making proceedings because of its ease of application. See generally J. Bow-
BRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961) (discussion of competing cost methods
in public utility ratemaking).
17. The long-run incremental cost of a single product is total company cost minus what
the total cost to the company would have been if it had not produced the single product,
divided by the quantity of the single product produced. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price
Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 9 n.26 (1979);
Joskaw & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213,
252 n.79 (1979).
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concerning AT&T's cost; AT&T generally used cost studies based on LRIC
for internal purposes' 8 while AT&T had been required to prepare several
cost studies for the FCC using various FDC methodologies' 9 which were
available to MCI.
At trial, the district court erroneously cast the parties' contentions as a
debate over the validity of the Areeda-Turner rule by equating LRIC with
average variable cost and equating FDC with average total cost.2" The trial
court, treating the choice of a proper cost standard as a question of fact,
instructed the jury to select the cost standard which they thought most ap-
propriately reflected the evidence of the case.' In overturning the jury's find-
ing that AT&T had engaged in predatory pricing by pricing its Hi-Lo tariff2
below FDC, the Seventh Circuit's opinion first focused on the propriety of
allowing the jury to choose which cost standard to apply.23 The court held
that the selection of the cost standard in predatory pricing cases was not
a factual issue to be determined by the jury but, rather, was a question
of law to be decided in the first instance by the judge.24
As a preliminary matter, the court emphasized that predatory pricing could
only be measured through a comparison of a defendant's prices and a
rigorously defined measure of cost.2" The court then characterized the use
of FDC as an arbitrary, unreliable, and unsuitable economic measure of
cost.26 Noting that no court had ever approved the use of FDC in a predatory
pricing case, the court stated:
Pricing at or above long-run incremental cost in a competitive market is
a rational and profitable business practice. Because there are legitimate,
and in fact compelling, business reasons for pricing products at or above
their long-run incremental cost, no predatory intent should be presumed
or inferred from such conduct.2
Thus, in order to establish a prima facie claim of predatory pricing in this
case, MCI bore the burden of establishing that AT&T's prices were below
the long-run incremental cost of providing the service. 8
Echoing the reasoning of the Areeda-Turner rule, the court held that some
form of a marginal or incremental cost standard was required to judge
18. 708 F.2d at 1116 n.47.
19. Results of cost studies utilizing seven different FDC methods were introduced at trial. Id.
20. Id. at 1115.
21. Id. at II11.
22. The so-called Hi-Lo tariff was AT&T's first departure from nationwide rate averaging
in the long-distance telecommunications market. Prices were lowered for certain high density
circuits and raised for low density circuits. A separate schedule was then established for shorter
routes. Hi-Lo was one of two tariffs at issue in MCI. The other tariff was Telpak, AT&T's
bulk rate for large users of private line circuits, which the jury found to be lawfully priced.
23. Id. at 1111-12.
24. Id. at 1111.
25. Id. at 1112-14.
26. Id. at 1116-17.
27. Id. at 1122-23.
28. Id.
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predatory pricing claims. 9 The majority opinion reasoned that allowing a
dominant firm to reduce its prices to long-run incremental cost served to
promote competition based on relative efficiency." Under this approach, con-
sumers would receive the benefits of such price reductions while only a less
efficient competitor would suffer as a result of its inability to be cost
efficient. 3'
MCI represents a victory for the theory, if not the precise results, of the
Areeda-Turner rule. 2 The portion of the opinion dealing with predatory pric-
ing also represents the ascendancy of a form of antitrust analysis more depen-
dent on economic theory than on traditional notions which require an in-
quiry into a defendant's intent. The majority's use of an economic
methodology underscores its belief that even when claims are brought against
a dominant firm, overly stringent rules imposing liability for predatory pric-
ing would create a "price umbrella" protecting inefficient competitors and
depriving consumers of the benefits of price reductions.3 Although the ma-
jority acknowledged the existence of more complex and indeterminate
economic models which suggest concerns over the pricing strategies of domi-
nant firms, it declined to address these concerns, stating that they were more
properly the province of the FCC in regulating the telecommunications
industry.'
B. Judge Wood's Dissent: The Fear of Monopoly Power
Although he agreed with the majority on most issues, Judge Harlington
Wood disagreed with the majority's treatment of predatory pricing and
damages. Judge Wood's dissent is particularly significant because it reflects
the deep philosophical divisions separating factions of the bench, bar, and
academic community over fundamental issues of antitrust law and policy.
Judge Wood, in considering the predatory pricing issue, adopted a two-
29. Id. at 1116.
30. Id. at 1117.
31. Id.
32. The specific cost-based test advocated by Areeda and Turner involved the use of average
variable cost. Areeda & Turner, supra note 6, at 716-18. The MCI court did not adopt average
variable cost, but adopted long-run incremental cost which the majority acknowledged was
an economic definition of average total cost for one product of a multi-product firm. 708
F.2d at 1116. The court explained its divergence from the precise formulation of the Areeda
and Turner test by stating:
We regard this case as being tried under a stipulation that a form of average total
cost would be used to determine predation. Thus, we analyze whether LRIC or
FDC is the most meaningful economic measure of average total cost. This analysis
should not be construed as a rejection of the Areeda-Turner rule using average
variable costs. We affirm our previous holding in Chillicothe that pricing below
average cost is normally one of the most relevant ipdications of predatory pricing.
Id. at 1120 n.54. But see id. at 1177 n.5 (the dissent's critique of the majority's use of economic
analysis).
33. 708 F.2d at 1125.
34. Id. at 1110-11.
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prong attack on the majority's strict adherence to price-cost comparisons
in adjudicating claims of predatory pricing. The first and broadest ground
for his disagreement concerned the majority's discounting of noneconomic
reasoning in its analysis of predation.35 Judge Wood argued that the ma-
jority had retreated from previous case law within the circuit which called
for a wide-ranging inquiry into the behavior of a dominant firm charged
with predatory tactics.36 Drawing on legislative history of the Sherman Act,37
along with a variety of secondary sources,3" Judge Wood argued that the
scope of the antitrust laws extended far beyond simply the promotion of
certain narrow forms of economic efficiency, because the antitrust laws were
broad instruments designed to restrain the acquisition and exploitation of
monopoly power.3 9 This position is in marked contrast to that of the ma-
jority, which would appear to tolerate the existence of dominant firms if
such firms achieve economies of scale not available to smaller competitors,
thus "dismiss[ing] concerns about the existence of vast social and economic
power of monopolies per se." °
Judge Wood also disagreed with the majority's conclusion that LRIC con-
stituted an appropriate measure of economic efficiency."' Stressing that the
majority was considering only one static form of efficiency, namely produc-
tive efficiency, which is not necessarily synonymous with enhanced consumer
welfare, 2 Judge Wood went on to argue in more technical terms that a com-
35. Id. at 1177-80.
36. Id. at 1176; see Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d
427, 430 (7th Cir. 1980); National Dairy Products Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 618-20 (7th
Cir. 1969).
37. 708 F.2d at 1177-80 (citing 21 CoNo. Rac. 2457 (1890)).
38. Id. (citing, inter alia, Blake and Jones, Towards a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy,
65 CALIF. L. REV. 422 (1955); Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Laws: 1887-1890,
23 U. CI. L. REV. 221 (1955); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 1051 (1979); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979); Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are
the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214 (1977)).
39. Id. Judge Wood's distaste for the majority's reliance solely on considerations of effi-
ciency is eloquently captured in the following excerpt from his dissent:
While not negating the value of policy arguments based on efficiency, I am hesi-
tant to abandon the jurisprudence and historical texture of the antitrust laws in
order to embrace a set of seemingly hard and fast efficiency rules which present
an illusion of conceptual and empirical tidiness. Instead, I would continue to per-
mit the kind of inquiry into predatory use of economic power which this court
encouraged in Chillicothe in order to preserve the important values embodied in
the Sherman Act .... I submit that no such contribution will be made if we limit
our definition of unlawful predation to the transgression of efficiency as defined
by the formulae of micro-economics.
Id. at 1179.
40. Id. at 1177.
41. Judge Wood claimed that the "majority's preoccupation with one special form of effi-
ciency .. . is too narrow even as an economic basis for a sound antitrust policy." Id. at
1180 (emphasis in original).
42. Id.
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parison of a firm's prices with its long-run incremental costs would not reveal
many forms of anticompetitive pricing behavior. He stated:
[T]he exclusive use of an LRIC standard to evaluate predatory pricing
ignores the fact that predation is a strategic weapon available to a
monopolist facing a new entrant. Such a test is therefore insensitive to
the many forms of strategic conduct by a dominant firm which have no
legitimate business purpose and are only instituted to discipline or eliminate
competition with accompanying long-run detrimental effects for
consumers.43
In focusing on the pricing strategies of a dominant firm, Judge Wood
contended that so-called objective price-cost comparisons were basically in-
capable of separating legitimate from predatory price reductions, and he
characterized the results of such tests as indeterminate.4" The test preferred
by Judge Wood would focus on the intent of the corporate actor and its
officers in formulating pricing strategies in the face of new competition. He
stated, "To shed light on these pricing strategies, which are the conscious
decisions of the corporate planners, it is only proper that a plaintiff must
be allowed to come forward with direct evidence of the defendant's intent
in this regard." 5 This willingness to examine an entire range of factors in
assessing predation, 6 as opposed to relying on the outcome of a cost-based
test, demonstrates Judge Wood's reluctance to foreclose any inquiry into
the exercise of monopoly power even if such behavior has at least a plausi-
ble, lawful explanation. While conceding the logic of the majority's predatory
pricing rule in attempted monopolization cases where the defendant lacks
significant market power, Judge Wood concluded that "there are sound
economic and social reasons to be wary of the market power exercised by
an existent monopolist who confronts a new entrant."" Based on the evidence
in the record, Judge Wood would have affirmed the verdict against AT&T
for predatory pricing.
43. Id. at 1181. Judge Wood identified limit pricing (maintaining less than profit-maximizing
prices in anticipation of the entry of a competitor in order to deter such entry) and differential
pricing (shifting of revenues and costs between competitive and monopolistic products) as forms
of anticompetitive pricing that an LRIC standard ignored. Id. at 1181-82.
44. Id. at 1182-83.
45. Id. at 1183.
46. Judge Wood cited with approval cases examining such factors as the timing of the pric-
ing reductions, the geographic selectivity of the price reductions, the availability of profitable
markets to offset temporary losses, and the selective use of massive product promotion. Id.
at 1181-83. Judge Wood relied in particular on the Sixth Circuit's decision in Borden, Inc.
v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498, 514-15 & n.40 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,383, and the Seventh Circuit's decision in National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d
605, 618-20 (7th Cir. 1969). With regard to the Borden case, it is interesting to note that the
FTC has subsequently modified its order to permit price reductions so long as prices exceed
average variable costs. See 44 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1104, at 491 (Mar.
3, 1983).
47. 708 F.2d at 1181.
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C. The Dominant Firm as a Vigorous Competitor
MCI represents the far swing of the pendulum away from the rule laid
down in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 8 in which Judge
Learned Hand stated that following proof of monopoly power, liability for
monopolization would ensue unless the monopolist proved that its conduct
fell "within the exception established in favor of those who do not seek,
but cannot avoid, the control of a market." 9 The demise of the rule casting
a rebuttable presumption of illegality on a dominant firm possessing the
necessary market share began in United States v. Grinnell." The Grinnell deci-
sion set forth the plaintiff's burden of proof under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act.' Under Grinnell, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had:
"(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth
or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historic accident." 2 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the so-called no
conduct theory of monopolization, and required an element of volitional
conduct before liability could be imposed under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 3
In Grinnell, the Supreme Court held that a firm possessing monopoly power
would be guilty of monopolization only if its actions were either illegal-
that is, a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act-or exclusionary. 4 While
48. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (on certification from the Supreme Court); see also United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347
U.S. 521 (1954) (taking an expansive approach to monopolization similar to that taken in United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.).
49. 148 F.2d at 431.
50. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign states, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony....
Id.
52. 384 U.S. at 570-71.
53. See generally Flynn, Monopolization Under the Sherman Act: The Third Wave and
Beyond, 26 ANTITRUsT BULL. 1, 110-11 (1981) (advocating the application of a tort duty-risk
test to antitrust cases); Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1288, 1352-58
(1982) (advocating retention of specific intent and dangerous probability of success elements
as used in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905)); Handler and Steuer, Attempts
to Monopolize and No-Fault Monopolization, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 191 (1980) (advocating
a dual consideration of a firm's structural monopolistic dominance and its conduct); Pryzant,
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.-The Beginning of the End of Monopolization,
23 S. TEX. L.J. 259 (1982) (advocating the use of a compartmental test under which the firm
must know, at the time of action, that it is doing something illegal); Note, The Conduct Stan-
dard for Legally Acquired Monopolies Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 49 U. CIN. L.
RaV. 206, 226-27 (1980) (advocating a conduct standard under which legal monopolies may
not adopt market practices which unnecessarily exclude competition).
54. 384 U.S. at 576.
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this precedent permitted a finding of monopolization even if the conduct
was not illegal, the lower courts after Grinnell quickly restricted the type of
conduct which would be labeled exclusionary and hence sufficient to impose
liability under section 2. In terms of predatory pricing, such a finding re-
quired that the dominant firm's prices be below some measure of costs in
order for the firm to be found guilty of violating the antitrust laws. 5 More
generally, it meant that a monopolist was permitted to compete, and com-
pete hard.
This theme was recently expressed in the Second Circuit's opinion in Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.56 In Berkey, the court stated that
monopoly power, in itself, is not unlawful, and that an integrated monopolist
does not violate section 2 of the Sherman Act by introducing a group of
dependent, related products without prior disclosure to its competitors. The
court stated:
It is the possibility of success in the marketplace, attributable to superior
performance, that provides the incentives on which the proper functioning
of our competitive economy rests. If a firm that has engaged in the risks
and expenses of research and development were required in all circumstances
to share with its rivals the benefits of those endeavors, the incentive would
very likely be vgtiated.
Withholding from others advance knowledge of one's new products,
therefore, ordinarily constitutes valid competitive conduct. Because, as we
have already indicated, a monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged,
by § 2 to compete aggressively on the merits, any success that it may achieve
through the process of invention and innovation is clearly tolerated by
the antitrust laws. 7
Similarly, the same court in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.8 held that a
monopolist had no obligation to license its patents to competitors. In SCM,
the court permitted the defendant to retain exclusionary power and unique
advantages derived from its patents by holding that once a patent has been
lawfully obtained, the antitrust laws do not impose liability for conduct per-
missible under the patent laws.59
The majority in MCI followed this tradition by contending that the anti-
trust laws should not be used to prevent a dominant firm from engaging
in price competition even if the result would be to prevent new entrants
from successfully competing in the market. In this regard the opinion states:
If FDC is adopted as a floor for predatory pricing purposes . . . the
regulated utility will be effectively prohibited from materially raising or
55. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
56. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
57. Id. at 281.
58. 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
59. Id. at 1204-06; see also Van Dyk Research Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 631 F.2d 251 (3d
Cir. 1980) (plaintiff must prove injury in fact from defendant's alleged abuse of the patent
system), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th
Cir.) (corporation can retain market share obtained through technological innovation by "the
adoption of legal and ordinary marketing methods already used by others in the market"),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
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lowering prices to engage in competition. This result flies in the face of
a major objective of the antitrust laws-the promotion of price competi-
tion. . . .An antitrust rule requiring a dominant firm to price at or above
FDC in competitive markets may effectively require the firm to forego
price competition and gradually abandon its market share, i.e., lose its
business. Constraining AT&T to FDC pricing of its competitive services
thus runs the risk of permitting actually or potentially less efficient com-
petitors to serve a growing segment of the telecommunications market and
thus deprive consumers of the benefits of price competition."
This point of view is in marked contrast to that of Judge Wood, who
described the American antitrust experience as an overwhelming "abhorrence
of the concentration of economic power." 6
The differences expressed by the majority and dissenting opinions in MCI
over the willingness to let a monopolist aggressively compete in both price
and product mirrors a growing split among the circuits that may eventually
force the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on what would be its first
predatory pricing case. 62 The economic and cost-oriented approach of the
majority opinion in MCI is in agreement with the Second Circuit's opinion
in Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 3
In rejecting predatory pricing claims based solely on evidence that prices
were below FDC, the Second Circuit stated:
Adopting marginal costs as the proper test of predatory pricing is consis-
tent with the pro-competitive thrust of the Sherman Act. When the price
of a dominant firm's product equals the product's marginal costs, "only
less efficient firms will suffer larger losses per unit of output; more effi-
cient firms will be losing less or even operating profitably." ...Marginal
cost pricing thus fosters competition on the basis of relative efficiency.
Establishing a pricing floor above marginal cost would encourage
underutilization of productive resources and would provide a price "um-
brella" under which less efficient firms could hide from the stresses and
storms of competition."
In contrast to the Seventh and Second Circuits, which relied on rules derived
from microeconomic theory, the Ninth Circuit has taken an entirely different
approach in determining the permissible pricing level of a dominant firm.
Breaking from its original approval of the Areeda-Turner rule,65 the Ninth
60. MCI, 708 F.2d at 1124-25.
61. Id. at 1178.
62. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in MCI on October 11, 1983. See supra note 1.
The Supreme Court's only reference to predatory pricing came in a price discrimination case
where the court held that the jury was entitled to consider the impact on the plaintiff that
is forced to lower its prices due to the defendant's predatory pricing. Utah Pie Co. v. Con-
tinental Baking Co., 387 U.S. 685, 698-99 (1967).
63. 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1438 (1982).
64. Id. at 87.
65. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742 n.27 (9th Cir.
1979); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 858 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
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Circuit fashioned a unique rule in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking Co." In Inglis, the court held that a defendant could
be guilty of predatory pricing even if prices were above its variable or
marginal costs. In rejecting per se rules of liability, the court created a set
of complex, shifting presumptions:
[T]o establish predatory pricing a plaintiff must prove that the anticipated
benefits of defendant's price depended on its tendency to discipline or
eliminate competition and thereby enhance the firm's long-term ability to
reap the benefits of monopoly power. If the defendant's prices were below
average total cost but above average variable cost, the plaintiff bears the
burden of showing [that] defendant's pricing was predatory. If, however,
the plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices were below average variable
cost, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of predatory pricing
and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the prices were justified
without regard to any anticipated destructive effect they might have on
competitors. 7
Inglis has been applied and extended by the Ninth Circuit in D&S Redi-Mix
v. Sierra Redi-Mix and Contracting Co.6" and Transamerica Computer Co.
v. IBM Corp." In D&S Redi-Mix, the Ninth Circuit held predatory the
generous provision of credit from a parent corporation to its subsidiary even
though the resulting price was not consistently below cost.7" In Transamerica
Computer, the court went even further and held that prices could be predatory
even if they were above the average total cost of the product or service in
question."' The court stated that it was prepared to find both limit pricing
and non-profit maximizing pricing strategies as violations of the Sherman
Act.72
The implications of the Ninth Circuit decisions are staggering. These cases
specifically avoid the creation of any zone of activities in which the pricing
behavior of a dominant firm is beyond judicial inquiry.73 The attitude of
the Ninth Circuit in this regard is irreconcilable with that of the Second
and Seventh Circuits, the differences stemming from fundamental
disagreements over the hazards of monopoly power. An opinion such as
Transamerica Computer suggests an overriding concern with the abuse of
monopoly power, and emphasizes the need to be vigilant in the scrutiny of
66. 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 58 (1982).
67. Id. at 1035-36.
68. 692 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982).
69. 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983).
70. 692 F.2d at 1248.
71. 698 F.2d at 1386-88.
72. Id. The court found both the practices of limit pricing and non-profit maximizing pric-
ing to be deterrents to new entrants into the market and, thus, violative of the Sherman Act
because of their exclusionary results. Id. at 1387.
73. Id. The practical result of this rule is to virtually prohibit summary judgment for either
the plaintiff or the defendant. Under the Ninth Circuit rule, even if a defendant's prices are
below average variable cost it could still attempt to justify the prices, a result barred by the
Areeda and Turner rule. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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monopolistic practices. On the other hand, both Northeastern Telephone and
MCI suggest a tolerance of firms with substantial monopoly power when
the economies of scale dictate that such firms are the most efficient pro-
ducers of a product or service. With this split among the circuits, it is time
for the Supreme Court to end its long silence and unify the law of predatory
pricing under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
D. The Fallacy of the Search for a Universal Rule
Predation is fast becoming the key concept in the law of monopolization.
Some commentators declare that the courts are immersed in the "third wave"
of cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act, where monopoly power will
be found unlawful only if the existence of monopoly power is accompanied
by some objectively defined bad act."4 The existence of predatory pricing
is already one of the most common allegations raised to fulfill the require-
ment of finding a "bad act" in monopolization cases.
With some notable exceptions," each of the commentators addressing the
issue of what constitutes unlawful predatory pricing has proposed "univer-
sal" rules which consist of single standards usually involving price-cost
comparisons.'" These rules are largely a response to Areeda and Turner's
attempt to formulate a rule that is responsive to economic theory, yet capable
of judicial application. Each of these rules, however, serves unsatisfactorily
as a universal gauge of predatory pricing. The Chicago approach," which
advocates no rule at all, is an analytically sterile denial of the existence of
the problem. It is simply too late in the American antitrust experience to
deny that predation is a legitimate subject for judicial inquiry, given a con-
sistent legislative condemnation of pricing strategies which are perceived as
being destructive of competition.'"
74. See, e.g., Sullivan, Monopolization. Corporate Strategy, The IBM Cases, and the
Transformation of the Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 587 (1982); Flynn, supra note 53, at 30.
75. See Dirlam, supra note II (advocating a case by case analysis); Scherer, Predatory Pric-
ing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976) (advocating judicial
analyses of effect and intent rather than use of simple cost rules); Sullivan, supra note 74.
76. The numerous competing rules are described and analyzed in Brodley & Hay, Predatory
Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL
L. REV. 738 (1981), and Calvani and Lynch, supra note 5.
77. Essentially, advocates of the Chicago School approach to antitrust jurisprudence con-
sider the motivation to injure or remove a competitor by pricing below cost to be irrational
absent strategic considerations leading to a corporate takeover. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX 160 (1978) ("the law [of predatory pricingl perceives threats to competition
where none exists"); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHt. L.
REV. 263 (1981); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1980); McGee,
Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958).
78. Pricing strategies such as rebates, discriminatory preferences, and localized price cutting
to suppress competition were among the perceived practices used by the nineteenth century
trusts to gain control of the production and distribution of given markets. The intent to pre-
vent such practices from'being used anticompetitively formed the background for the passage
of the Sherman Act itself. The classic expression of these concerns is found in Standard Oil
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The majority of the suggested rules recognize the existence of at least
limited instances in which predatory pricing is a rational business strategy.79
Due to the recognition that some price reductions are pro-competitive, pro-
ponents of these rules seek to determine the legality of price cuts by apply-
ing various economic tests which attempt to divide lawful conduct from per
se violations of the Sherman Act." While it is beyond the scope of this
article to analyze critically the economic foundations of each of these rules,
it is contended that the attempts to find a universally applicable rule have
done more harm than good.
Particularly in light of the enormous influence the professional literature
has had on judicial attitudes regarding the antitrust laws, the proliferation
of such rules constitutes a grave threat to the judicial decision-making pro-
cess. Judges in predatory pricing cases are now looking to a bewildering
maze of academic jargon, each piece articulating seemingly objective, but
in reality, mutually exclusive, tests to determine whether price cutting is in
fact unlawful. The wholehearted subscription to any of these economic rules
can represent a dangerous, even if well-intentioned, abdication of judicial
responsibility. If judges were to rely on one particular theory, the interpreta-
tion of antitrust laws promulgated nearly a century ago would be consigned
to modern day academicians, rather than to a court of law. Once all intent
evidence is excluded, or relegated to peripheral status, as so often occurs
under the proposed economic tests for predatory pricing, the judge and jury
would be left adrift in a sea of opposing economic experts and commen-
tators with conflicting, esoteric viewpoints."
When a judge adopts any of the purely economic predatory pricing rules
as the sole expression of antitrust law, that judge has implicitly entered his
vote in the battle that still rages over the proper goals of the antitrust laws. 2
In addition, total reliance on any economic rule raises fundamental ques-
tions about the role of the jury in antitrust cases. If the law of predatory
pricing transforms itself into an exercise in applied industrial organization
economics, then the line separating questions of law and fact will be redrawn,
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911). These concerns were also the subject of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976 & 1980 Supp.), which barred price discrimination. In addi-
tion to federal law, virtually all states have antitrust statutes which explicitly parallel federal
antitrust laws, and several states have more specific statutes addressing pricing strategies. See
generally Waxman, Wisconsin's Unfair Sales Act-Unfair to Whom?, 66 MARQUETTE L. REV.
293, 295-96 nn.18-19 (1983) (noting passage in several states of versions of the Robinson-Patman
Act as well as unfair sales acts).
79. Brodley & Hay, supra note 76, at 757-64; Calvani & Lynch, supra note 5, at 382-97.
80. Id.
81. In MCI, for example, each side offered diametrically opposed testimony. Dr. William
Melody argued that pricing below fully distributed cost was predatory, while Dr. William Baumol
argued at length that only prices below long-run incremental cost could be considered predatory.
A presumably exasperated Judge Grady declared the entire issue a question of fact and sent
the matter to the jury. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
82. See Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGs L.J. 65 (1982).
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diminishing the role of the jury in the process. There will be little left for
the fact finder to do if, as a matter of law, pricing is found unlawful when
prices are below a certain measure of cost and lawful when above that same
measure.
Most importantly, for a court to adhere to any of these exclusively
economic tests falsely suggests that the pro- or anti-competitive effects of
business behavior can be measured in precisely the same fashion for every
firm and every industry. Industries differ greatly in structural characteristics
such as the elasticity of demand, the growth or diminution of the market,
the ratio of fixed to variable costs, and the pace of emerging technology
rendering a current plant obsolete. Furthermore, firms within a given in-
dustry differ in their productive efficiency, extent of excess capacity, and
their composition of costs. It is preposterous to assume that the consequences
of actions taken by firms with such widely divergent characteristics can be
ascertained accurately through any single price-cost comparison.
A finding of monopolization should therefore rest in part on economic
tests geared to the particular firm and industry in question. But there is
no persuasive reason why these tests should be determinative. In addition
to price evidence, the judge will normally have at his disposal a variety of
noneconomic data, largely falling under the rubric of "intent" evidence. Such
evidence is relevant to any judicial decision, and is certainly probative of
the intentions qf the human actors whose pricing decisions are under
scrutiny.83 Examination of both cost and intent evidence appears to be the
most effective and complete method of ascertaining the legality of behavior,
such behavior normally being unascertainable when measured only by a single
set of economic criteria.
However, total reliance on a case-by-case approach overlooks the fact that
the vast majority of price reductions represent healthy, vigorous price com-
petition and are entirely beyond the purview of the antitrust laws. To per-
mit judicial scrutiny of any and all price reductions runs counter to one
of the avowed purposes of the antitrust laws, which is to promote price
competition.8" Furthermore, it deprives the businessman of any certainty in
operating his enterprise and wastes an enormous amount of both public and
privale resources in litigation. In this regard, it appears that no cause of
action should exist whenever a defendant's prices are above an economically
relevant measure of average total cost."
Neither the majority nor the dissent in MCI took a hard line on what
standard to apply in predatory pricing cases. The majority, while opting for
reliance on an economic test for predatory pricing, acknowledged that its
83. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note I1; Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines:
What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1229 (1977).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
85. This is the result in MCI, where the majority chose the cost measure which most closely
approximated an economist's definition of the average total cost of one product in a multiproduct
firm. 708 F.2d at 1114-98.
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choice of cost standards was dictated, in part, by the facts of the case."
In addition, the majority refused to take the further step of holding that
intent evidence was either irrelevant or inadmissible.87 Even the dissent, while
arguing for a broader inquiry based on noneconomic factors, conceded that
prices in excess of certain 'economic standards represent no threat to com-
petition, and therefore should be conclusively lawful.8
Arguably, there are two types of predatory pricing cases in which purely
economic criteria should be determinative. First, price-cost comparisons should
conclusively determine liability in cases where the plaintiff's sole evidence
of predation is the pricing behavior of the defendant. When a litigant stakes
its entire case on empirical economic data, it is certainly fair to judge such
evidence by rigorous economic standards.
The second category of cases in which economic tests of predation should
be determinative concerns allegations of predatory pricing in attempted
monopolization cases, In attempted monopolization cases, the defendant lacks
monopoly power by definition. 9 Typically, the market shares of these defen-
dants are quite low." Under such circumstances, it is important to emphasize
the pro-competitive aspects of price reductions. Thus, any claim that price
reductions have anti-competitive effects should be permitted to proceed only
when such claims are supported by solid economic evidence that the price
cuts serve to reduce, rather than promote, competition in the long run.
The importance of rigorous economic analysis in attempted monopoliza-
tion cases is underscored by the tendency of courts to use a finding of below-
cost pricing to infer the other elements of the offense of attempted
monopolization. While the textbook elements of an attempt to monopolize
are specific intent, unlawful or exclusionary conduct, and a dangerous prob-
ability of success, 9 some courts have simply presumed the other elements
once the defendant is found to have engaged in below-cost 'pricing.92 Because
this determination is crucial, it is reasonable to insist that courts utilize a
rigorous economic definition of cost; otherwise, drastic legal consequences
might flow from economically ambiguous pricing behavior. In these limited
circumstances, exclusive reliance on the Areeda-Turner rule is appropriate,
86. Id. at 1120.
87. Id. at 1123 n.58.
88. Id. at 1176-77 (J. Wood, dissenting).
89. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946); Swift & Co.
v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
90. See, e.g., Robert's Waikiki U Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-a-Car Sys., 491 F. Supp.
1199 (D. Hawaii 1980) (defendant's market share less than 25%).
91. See generally American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
92. California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 737 (9th Cir. 1979);
Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 453 & n.47 (9th Cir. 1979); Gough
v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 390 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Mar-
quis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 1977); Janich Bros. v. American Distilling
Co., 570 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
1983]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
given the view that there can be no pro-competitive value to pricing below
short-run marginal or variable cost.
1I. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
Despite the prominence of the predatory pricing allegations in MCI, the
Court also resolved a series of charges that AT&T had unlawfully refused
to interconnect MCI with its local distribution facilities. 3 The Seventh Cir-
cuit's unanimous affirmance of all but one of the findings of liability on
this issue94 hinged on its application of the so-called essential facilities doc-
trine. Unlike the typical rule which allows a firm to unilaterally choose its
customers as it wishes," the essential facilities doctrine, also called the "bottle-
neck principle," requires a monopolist controlling a scarce resource to deal
with all those requesting access to the facility on reasonable terms. 6 This
obligation, akin to that of a common carrier, is imposed to prevent a
monopolist from using its control of one stage of production to extend its
monopoly power into adjacent markets.97
Liability under the essential facilities doctrine is established upon proof
of: (1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's
inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the facility; (3) the feasibility
of providing a competitor access to the facility; and (4) the denial of the
use of a facility to a competitor. 9 In the leading Supreme Court case
establishing liability under this theory, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States,9" the Court affirmed a grant of injunctive relief against a utility which
used its control of transmission facilities to maintain its monopoly by refus-
ing to sell or wheel power to towns which created their own electricity
93. Because MCI only provided microwave transmission over intercity circuits, the com-
pany required physical interconnections in both the transmitting and the receiving cities in order
to complete a long-distance call from the office or home of the sender to that of the receiver.
MCI alleged that AT&T unlawfully refused to provide these interconnections. For other related
allegations, see infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text.
94. The court unanimously refused to impose liability for AT&T's denial of multipoint in-
terconnections. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
95. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
96. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.D.C. 1977) (quoting A.D. NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (2d ed. 1970)). The Hecht court also quoted
from Professor Sullivan's definition of the essential facilities doctrine as follows:
illf a group of competitors, acting in concert, operate a common facility and if
due to natural advantage, custom, or restrictions of scale, it is not feasible for
excluded competitors to duplicate the facility, the competitors who operate the facility
must give access to the excluded competitors on reasonable, nondiscriminatory terms.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 131 (quoted in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982,
992 n.36 (D.D.C. 1977)). For a discussion of the bottleneck theory, see Comment, Refusals
to Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1720, 1722 (1974).
97. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. Ter-
minal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
98. 708 F.2d at 1132-33; Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
99. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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distribution systems.' ° While Otter Tail does provide an analogy to the MCI
case, an important difference must be noted. The essential facilities doctrine
was used by the court in MCI to support a treble damage award rather
than, as in Otter Tail, a prospective injunction. Since the MCI court
remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of damages counts only, 0 '
the Seventh Circuit's affirmance of treble damage liability based on the essen-
tial facilities doctrine is particularly significant.10 2
The court in MCI held that the facilities which AT&T controlled, the local
telephone systems in metropolitan areas, were essential because traditionally
local telephone service has been classified as a natural monopoly.' 03 A poten-
tial competitor in long-distance service would be economically unable to
duplicate the miles of cable and wire necessary to provide intracity phone
service. Furthermore, the competitor would also be unable to obtain
regulatory approval to do so.' 4 The court held that AT&T refused to pro-
vide interconnections in order to injure MCI as a competitor, and that no
legitimate business, regulatory, or technical reasons existed to excuse AT&T's
refusal to interconnect MCI with its local facilities.'10 Consequently, the court
found that AT&T had a duty to provide MCI with access to its interconnec-
tions, thereby enabling MCI to enter the long-distance telephone market and
attempt to compete with AT&T.' 6
MCI's claim for "multipoint interconnections" provides an interesting ex-
ample of the dangers of an overly expansive utilization of the essential
facilities doctrine in treble damage litigation. The court rejected MCI's in-
terpretation of the doctrine by refusing to affirm liability for AT&T's denial
of the multipoint interconnections. As an illustration, the need for multi-
point interconnections exists where MCI has a private line circuit running
from City A to City B, and AT&T has a private line circuit running from
City B to City C. A multipoint connection would connect the MCI and AT&T
circuits at City B, allowing an MCI customer to place a call directly from
City A to City C, with each carrier receiving revenue for its portion of the
circuit used in making the call.
Unlike its holding with regard to the other interconnections, the court did
not hold AT&T liable for its refusal to provide such multipoint interconnec-
tions to MCI. The court reasoned that unlike connections for intracity ser-
vice, MCI had both the ability and the right to build circuits to serve long-
distance markets it presently did not serve.0 7 Thus, multipoint interconnec-
tions were not essential. The court went on to express its concern that the
FCC may not have intended to impose the obligation on AT&T to assist
100. Id. at 382.
101. Id. at 1166-67.
102. For a discussion of the implications of such an expansive view of the essential facilities
doctrine, see infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
103. 708 F.2d at 1133.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1147.
107. Id. at 1148.
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MCI in competing for long-distance business in areas where MCI could have,
but had not, made any significant capital investment.' °8
The majority opinion suggests a rather strict reading of the requirements
for application of the essential facilities doctrine in order to impose treble
damage liability. According to the court's analysis in MCI, a new entrant
will have to demonstrate its substantial entry into the market and its inabil-
ity to duplicate the required facilities, for either economic or regulatory
reasons, before the court will impose liability on the monopolist for its failure
to provide access to the facilities it controls. In addition, it appears that
the dominant firm must have a natural monopoly, or maintain a bottleneck
at one stage of production, before the essential facilities doctrine will apply.
It is doubtful that a showing of the dominant firm's mere competitive ad-
vantage will suffice to meet this burden of proof under the essential facilities
doctrine.' °9
The court's strict construction of the essential facilities doctrine stemmed
mostly from the fact that treble damage liability was at stake in MCI. A
finding of liability under the essential facilities doctrine becomes far more
plausible when viewed in the context of a request for injunctive relief.'' 0
Since injunctive relief sought in that context is prospective, courts will 'not
be concerned about the imposition of massive monetary damages for past
conduct that was the result of either an innocent mistake of judgment or
of the defendant's misreading of its legal obligation. ' ' ' In addition, the stan-
108. Id. at 1149. The court acknowledged the serious consequences that would result from
the imposition of liability under such a theory:
As a matter of antitrust liability . . . can an entrant which actually builds its own
facilities between Chicago and Milwaukee, for example, thereby gain entitlement
to use all the far-flung facilities of the Bell System? Is its entitlement based on
its expressed intention to duplicate major portions of the Bell System on a national
basis? Could it claim entitlement before (or without) building any facilities of its own?
Id.
109. Absent regulatory requirements, it appears that the court will not impose treble damage
liability unless the firm denying access to the facilities has achieved a natural monopoly as
a result of its control over the facilities. This position is a retreat from previous Supreme Court
cases which can be construed as requiring only that the denied facility confer upon the established
firm a unique competitive advantage. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
It is unclear whether the MCI court would have insisted on such a strict rule if the plaintiffs
had sought only injunctive relief. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
110. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
Ill. For example, in MCI the obligation of AT&T to provide the requested interconnections
stemmed from a broad reading of the FCC's 1971 decision in Specialized Common Carriers,
29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), which was described by the district judge as an "abomination" and
"one of the worst examples of legal draftmanship I have ever seen." 708 F.2d at 1095 n.13.
The Specialized Common Carriers decision declared that public policy required open competi-
tion in the specialized long-distance services markets. The FCC did not define, however, which
specialized services the decision covered. AT&T interpreted the decision to apply only to single
point private line connections, while MCI interpreted the decision to include foreign exchange
lines and multipoint interconnections, as well as single point connections. Id. at 1095. Further
complicating matters was the FCC's previous position, taken in a brief filed in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, that AT&T was not obligated to provide the interconnections. It was not until 1974 that
the FCC conclusively ordered AT&T to provide interconnections. See Bell System Tariff Offer-
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dards for injunctive relief require a showing of irreparable injury as well
as a balancing of hardships,' 2 thereby permitting a court to assess the ex-
tent of the competitor's entry into the market and the extent of the com-
petitor's "free ride" on the dominant firm's facilities before mandating ac-
cess to the essential facility.
III. DAMAGES
A. Causation and Disaggregation
Another principal feature of MCI is the court's discussion of the elements
necessary to prove both causation of damages and the amount of damages.
In its complaint, MCI charged AT&T with twenty-two types of actions con-
stituting monopolization. ' 3 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of AT&T on seven of these counts.' 4 The jury found for MCI
on ten of the remaining counts and in favor of AT&T on five of the counts." ' '
For these violations, the jury awarded MCI $600 million, which was trebled
to produce a damage award of $1.8 billion." 6
ings of Local Distributioh Facilities for Use by Other Common Carriers, 46 F.C.C.2d 413,
aff'd sub nor. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1026 (1975).
112. Cf. Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Med-Center, 684 F.2d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir.
1982) (plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff,
the potential harm to defendant if relief is granted, and the public interest in the resolution
of the dispute are four factors that a court must address in determining the propriety of
preliminary injunctive relief).
113. 708 F.2d at 1092. The court divided the 22 types of actions into the categories of predatory
pricing, denial of interconnections, negotiation in bad faith, and unlawful tying. Id.
114. The district court directed a verdict in favor of AT&T on the claims alleging that AT&T
was guilty of the following:
(1) inducing Western Union to file a tariff which mirrored the St. Louis-Chicago
charges of MCI;
(2) increasing AT&T's capacity to conduct business in data communications for
the purpose of destroying competition;
(3) introducing experimental service to discourage potential customers from dealing
with MCI;
(4) disparaging MCI;
(5) bringing sham proceedings before certain administrative and judicial bodies;
(6) participating in a massive public propaganda campaign conducted against
MCI; and
(7) refusing to provide Joint Telpak (a special tariff offering available to large
telephone consumers, i.e., the federal government) to MCI.
Id. at 1092 n.5.
115. The jury found AT&T guilty of the following: refusing FX and CCSA interconnections
to MCI; tying; disconnecting MCI's customers; denying multipoint interconnections; unreasonably
limiting the geographic scope of those interconnections actually provided; providing inappropriate
or inefficient equipment; negotiating in bad faith with MCI; filing state tariffs in bad faith;
predatory pricing of its Hi-Lo service; and unlawful pre-announcement of Hi-Lo. The jury
found for AT&T on allegations of discriminating against MCI on interconnection charges; charg-
ing MCI unreasonably high prices for interconnections; late or faulty installations; interfering
with MCI's financing; and predatory pricing of Telpak. See id. at 1207-09 app. (setting forth
the jury's special verdict).
116. Id. at 1093.
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MCI's proof of damages consisted of the introduction of a lost-profits
study accompanied by supporting testimony. ' 7 The study compared the
revenues earned by a hypothetical MCI, undamaged by any of the alleged
anticompetitive acts of AT&T, with the revenues actually earned by MCI.
The data regarding the "undamaged" MCI were derived from the forecasts
contained in the original business plans of the corporation." 8 The data regard-
ing the "damaged" MCI came from the actual financial performance of
the corporation including projections into the future." 9 The differences in
profitability between these two models were computed on a yearly basis and
then reduced to a present value.' 20
AT&T attacked the lost-profits study on two separate grounds. First, AT&T
argued that the lost-profits study improperly included damages for losses
that stemmed from both the lawful and the unlawful acts of AT&T.' 2' AT&T
also argued that the study was based upon erroneous assumptions that had
no support in the record.'2 2 Specifically, AT&T challenged the assumptions
that MCI could have earned eighty-five cents per circuit mile per month;'2
that MCI would have had thirty-seven million circuit miles in place prior
to 1975;"2 and that MCI could have obtained financing for their contemplated
system.' 2' MCI argued in response that it was not required to "disaggregate"
its proof of the amount of damages where lawful conduct was intertwined
with unlawful acts, and it presented further arguments in defense of the
various assumptions used in its study. 2 6
The court held that MCI's lost-profits study was insufficient because it
lacked a proper foundation and was based upon insupportable assumptions.' 2'
The court also held that the study failed to address the question of causa-
tion of the damages it claimed. The court noted that the study, which was
prepared well in advance of trial, was based upon the assumption that all
of the acts listed in MCI's complaint would in fact be held unlawful.' 28 Thus,
the study set forth alleged lost profits based on twenty-two acts, of which
only eight were subsequently found to be unlawful.' 2 9
117. Id. at 1160-61, 1164.
118. Id. at 1160-61. These forecasts were modified because of certain events unattributable
to AT&T. Id.
119. Id.




123. Brief for Appellant at 162-63, MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
124. Id. at 163-64.
125. Id. at 165-67.
126. Brief for Appellee at 146-53, 160-83, MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
127. MCI Communications Corp, v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1164-65 (7th
Cir. 1983).
128. Id. at 1163.
129. Among the lawful acts included in MCI's lost-profits study were the pricing strategies
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The lost-profits study was therefore rejected by the court because it im-
properly calculated damages based on both lawful and unlawful acts, and
did not permit a fact finder to make a reasonable and principled estimation
of the damages flowing from the unlawful conduct of the defendant.' 30 The
court's language on this point was unequivocal:
It is a requirement that an antitrust plaintiff must prove that his damages
were caused by the unlawful acts of the defendant. . . . Once causation
of damages has been established, the amount of damages may be deter-
mined by a just and reasonable estimate as long as the jury verdict is
not the product of speculation or guess work.' 3'
The court concluded that given the significance of the acts judged to be
lawful, "it would be unjust and contrary to the policies of the treble damage
remedy to award MCI damages which may compensate it for the effects
of such quantitatively significant lawful competition."' 3 2
If read literally, the majority opinion would limit the common law rule
against requiring strict disaggregation' 33 to only those situations in which
the plaintiff had proved that all of the alleged antitrust violations were, in
fact, unlawful acts. Thus, the plaintiff would have to disaggregate its damages
to prove the specific dollar amounts of injury caused by each of the separate
unlawful acts."' If the opinion is interpreted in such a strict manner, MCI
represents a substantial departure from the previous rule announced by the
for both Telpak and Hi-Lo, which constituted some of the major competitive handicaps for
MCI to overcome in entering the market. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
130. 708 F.2d at 1162-63.
131. Id. at 1161 (emphasis in the original).
132. Id. at 1164. Several circuit courts of appeals have similarly overturned damage awards
which compensated for both lawful and unlawful competition. See, e.g., Murphy Tugboat Co.
v. Crowley, 658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Murphy Tugboat Co. v.
Shipowners & Merchants Tugboat Co., 455 U.S. 1018 (1982); Van Dyk Research Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 631 F.2d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981); Coleman
Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975); Momand v. Universal Film Ex-
changes, Inc., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949); see also R.S.E.,
Inc. v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (plaintiff's lost-profits study
made no provision for effects of lawful competition); ILC Peripheral Leasing Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (plaintiff's damage evidence deemed too speculative
because no explanation given for factors other than defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct),
aff'd per curiam sub nor. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
For example, the Third Circuit in Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338
(3d Cir. 1975), ordered a new trial because the evidence showed that damages had been based,
in part, on conduct that had been found to be lawful. The plaintiff, a former independently-
owned dealer who complained of discrimination in favor of factory-owned dealerships, offered
expert testimony which purported to calculate the volume of sales which would have been ex-
pected if no factory dealerships had been established. Id. at 1351-52. The court held that the
failure to account for lawful competition from the factory dealers required reversal and a new
trial because of the potentially significant effect on the amount of damages. Id. at 1353.
133. Cases which support a rule against the disaggregation of damages include Continental
Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962); Locklin v. Day-Glo
Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971).
134. 708 F.2d at 1162.
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Seventh Circuit in Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.'35 In Spray-
Rite, a ten million dollar treble damage award was challenged on the basis
that the plaintiff had failed to quantify the amount of damage caused by
each of the challenged practices.' 6 The court rejected this theory, relying
on the familiar proposition that a successful antitrust plaintiff need not pro-
ve with precision the amount of damages attributable to each unlawful prac-
tice of the defendant.' 37 Under the authority of Spray-Rite, a plaintiff is
under no absolute duty to disaggregate its proof of the amount of damages
in order to recover. The court stated that if the plaintiff can show that disag-
gregation is impracticable, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show
the contrary.'8
The Spray-Rite court went on to address the point that the total aggregated
damages forced the defendant, Monsanto, to compensate Spray-Rite for lost
profits caused by purely lawful competition.' 39 Monsanto contended that it
was impossible to determine whether the jury had found all of Monsanto's
distribution policies unlawful.' 0 The court dismissed this contention by simply
repeating the disaggregation theory it had relied on earlier. The court noted
that the jury had found at least one of Monsanto's practices to be unlawful,
and permitted full recovery despite the fact that two of the three allegedly
unlawful practices may have been perfectly legal.' 4'
Spray-Rite thus addresses as a matter of disaggregation what MCI describes
135. 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3627 (U.S. March 1, 1983)
(No. 82-914) (certiorari granted on issues unrelated to the damage issues discussed in this arti-
cle); see also Trabert & Hoeffer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp., 633 F.2d 477, 483-84 (7th Cir.
1980) (fact finder may use probability and inference in determining damages in a refusal to
deal case).
136. 684 F.2d at 1242. The allegations included resale price maintenance, group boycotts,
and unlawful distribution policies relating to dealer compensation, shipping, and assignments
of territories.
137. Id. at 1242; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Bigelow
v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parch-
ment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
138. 684 F.2d at 1242-43.
139. Id. at 1243.
140. Monsanto based its argument on an interrogatory, answered in the affirmative by the
jury, which it felt was ambiguously worded. The interrogatory was put to the jury as follows:
Were the compensation program and/or areas of primary responsibility, and/or
shipping policy created by Monsanto pursuant to a conspiracy or combination with
one or more of its distributors to fix, maintain or stabilize resale prices of Mon-
santo herbicides?
Id. at 1243 n.12 (emphasis in original). Monsanto had requested that the interrogatory be phrased
in the conjunctive, but the court inserted the or at Spray-Rite's request.
141. Id. at 1243. The opinion stated:
Clearly, Spray-Rite is entitled to recover the lost profits caused by Monsanto's anti-
competitive business practices. We will not deprive Spray-Rite of this recovery merely
because the jury may have found that Monsanto combined lawful conduct with
unlawful conduct making it impossible to determine which portion of the total
damages was caused by the unlawful conduct.
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as proof of causation. These two concepts, however, are distinct from one
another. It makes sense, from the standpoint of successful antitrust enforce-
ment, to prevent a defendant from avoiding a treble damage award simply
because the plaintiff's losses escape precise quantification. To allow such
an escape, by requiring the plaintiff to disaggregate its damages, would render
the defendant unaccountable for its unlawful acts.' 42 In its simplest form,
the rule against requiring disaggregation states that a plaintiff need not
separately calculate the amount of damages caused by each of the defen-
dant's unlawful actions. A plaintiff still must prove, however, that its losses
were in fact caused by the allegedly unlawful acts. A plaintiff has no right
to collect damages, let alone treble damages, for losses due to lawful com-
petition. Any losses that flow from such legitimate competitive practices can-
not constitute compensable antitrust injury. 43 This distinction between causa-
tion and disaggregation was recognized in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc.,' 44 in which the Supreme Court stated that the rule against requiring
disaggregation only comes into play after proof that the harm was caused
by the wrongful acts of the defendant.'
The majority in MCI tried to reconcile its holding with that of Spray-Rite
in a number of ways.' 6 First, the majority opinion in MCI gives an ex-
tremely narrow reading to Spray-Rite as a result of the factually peculiar
situation in that case. In Spray-Rite, the court had to construe an ambiguously
drafted special interrogatory which made it impossible to determine whether
the jury found liability for one act or for three acts of the defendant.' 7
The Spray-Rite court's statement that there was substantial evidence to sup-
port the verdict on all three counts is consistent with a rule requiring strict
proof of causation.' 8
Spray-Rite retains a great deal more vitality once another factual distinc-
tion from MCI is realized. In Spray-Rite, the principal anti-competitive prac-
142. As the Supreme Court stated in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251,
264-65 (1946):
Any other rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at the
expense of his victim. It would be an inducement to make wrongdoing so effective
and complete in every case as to preclude any recovery, by rendering the measure
of damages uncertain. Failure to apply it would mean that the more grievous the
wrong done, the less likelihood there would be of a recovery.
143. "Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."
Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (emphasis in the original).
144. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
145. Id. at 264.
146. MCI, 708 F.2d at 1163-64.
147. 684 F.2d at 1233; see supra note 132.
148. 684 F.2d at 1242 n.ll. But see MCI, 708 F.2d 1081, 1188-89 (7th Cir. 1983), where
Judge Wood argued that the Spray-Rite court explicitly prefaced its disaggregation argument
by assuming, arguendo, that at least one of the challenged practices was indeed lawful. See
also Trabert & Hoeffer, Inc. v. Piaget Watch Corp., 633 F.2d 477-(7th Cir. 1980) (damages
in a refusal to deal case may be inferred from a decline in profits once it is shown that such
a decline was proximately caused by defendant's wrongful act).
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tice at issue was an unlawful dealer termination pursuant to a conspiracy
to fix resale prices.' The practices that were the subject of the special
interrogatory-restrictive shipping, compensation, and territorial policies-
were alleged to have been part of the same conspiracy. From the plaintiff's
point of view, these practices were of relatively minor significance in com-
parison to the termination and subsequent boycott of the plaintiff.' ° Thus,
in Spray-Rite, little harm was done by awarding aggregate damages which
may have included some minor elements of lawful conduct by the defen-
dant. In contrast, the jury in MCI, and later the reviewing court, expressly
found the conduct lawful which the plaintiff had alleged to be one of the
principal sources of its damages.'"' For example, the Telpak tariff, which
the jury found non-predatory, was perhaps the largest single element in MCI's
case since Telpak supposedly prevented MCI from selling to the largest users
of long-distance services. 2 In addition, the Seventh Circuit found that
AT&T's Hi-Lo was lawfully priced, thereby rejecting MCI's argument that
it unlawfully prevented MCI from serving smaller customers as well.' 53
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Seventh Circuit in MCI rejected
evidence of damages which failed to account for the effect of such
devastating, but lawful, competition.
Nonetheless, Spray-Rite and MCI remain at odds over which party has
the burden of proof on issues of causation and disaggregation. The Spray-
Rite court held that when disaggregation is possible, the plaintiff must pro-
duce particularized damage evidence which relates its alleged losses to the
individual unlawful acts of the defendant.' 54 Spray-Rite also holds that when
a successful plaintiff comes forward with evidence that disaggregation is not
possible, then the burden should shift to the defendant to prove that disag-
gregation was possible.' 55 On the other hand, MCI holds that, at least where
the lawful competition is "quantitatively significant," the burden of proof
should remain on the plaintiff to show that its losses stemmed from purely
unlawful practices of the defendant.5 6 Since it appears that Spray-Rite and
MCI suggest differing burdens of proof on the issue of causation and disag-
gregation, depending both on the quantitative impact of the various lawful
and unlawful acts of the defendants and on the impracticability of requiring
the plaintiff to prove precise damages, the definitive resolution of this ques-
tion awaits further clarification.
149. 684 F.2d at 1238-40.
150. Id. at 1236-37.
151. 708 F.2d at 1164. The significance of the jury finding that Telpak was lawfully priced
is underscored by the fact that Telpak constituted over half the private line market. Id. In
addition, Telpak was aimed at the very largest of the private line users, the federal government
and private corporations, which MCI considered to be its own preferred market. Id.
152. The United States purchased over half the Telpak circuits. Id. at 1165-66.
153. Id. at 1164.
154. 684 F.2d at 1242-43; see also Greene v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 655 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 423, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636
F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981).
155. 684 F.2d at 1243.
156. MCI, 708 F.2d at 1164.
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IV. THE PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND: A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES
The final portion of the MCI opinion constitutes the court's decision to
remand for a new trial only on the issue of damages.' 7 The court invoked
Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"'R in remanding for deter-
mination of this issue. The opinion states that while a new trial on liability
was unnecessary, a new trial on damages was required in light of the court's
decision that AT&T had not engaged in predatory pricing. '
This determination, when read in conjunction with the court's opinion
on proof of causation of damages, is a strong endorsement of bifurcated
trials whenever complex multi-issue charges are raised in a complaint.
Whenever lump sum damages are requested for a variety of allegedly unlawful
acts, the plaintiff runs the risk of having the damage evidence deemed inad-
missible if the jury, the trial court, or the reviewing court rejects the illegal-
ity alleged in any of the significant counts.' 6 ° In such a case, under the ra-
tionale of MCI, a new trial on damages would be required unless the damage
evidence was sufficiently precise to show which damages were caused by each
act of the defendant.' 6' Since such a showing is normally infeasible, an an-
titrust plaintiff will be left with two options. First, he can forego damages
based on lost profits and present evidence of specific acts or practices by
the defendant that have caused it to lose particular customers and have denied
him access to specific market shares. While this approach may be practical
in a case such as MCI, where the plaintiff sought to serve a discrete number
of customers with extremely demanding needs,' 62 such an approach represents
an impossible burden in the more typical case which does not involve the
competition for particular, identifiable customers. The practical alternative
is thus a bifurcated trial where, after the liability issues have been resolved,
157. Id. at 1166-69.
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) states:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue
or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counter-claims, third-party claims, or
issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
159. The court stated:
A new trial on liability is unwarranted since this court has affirmed liability for
monopolization on the basis of most of AT&T's actions involving interconnection
with MCI. No new trial is required on those issues where we have set aside the
findings at trial because our conclusion in these areas was based on a lack of evidence
or other legal deficiency and not mere trial error. . . . A new trial on damages
is required to reflect the determinations by the jury, and by this court, that AT&T's
pricing policies were not predatory.
708 F.2d at 1166-67 (emphasis in original).
160. It is unclear whether a new trial would be required if a finding of liability on a relative-
ly trivial issue were reversed on appeal. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
161. 708 F.2d at 1162-63.
162. MCI's original strategy required MCI to serve the members of the business and in-
dustrial community who needed extensive private line facilities for communications between
various plants and offices. Id. at 1094.
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the plaintiff can structure its proof of damages to reflect only those acts
found to be unlawful.
While remand for a new trial on damages is not particularly novel in an-
titrust cases,' 63 it does pose significant problems. First, the calculation of
damages to be resolved on a partial remand must be sufficiently separate
and distinct from the issues of liability so as not to prejudice the defendant.'64
In addition, to make the new trial on damages workable, the appellate court
must be able to set forth with considerable specificity which issues remain
unresolved, whether further discovery will be permitted, the effect of prior
evidentiary rulings, and how much information concerning liability should
be presented on remand so the jury may intelligently evaluate the evidence
as to the amount of damages to be awarded.' 65 Such guidance is inherently
difficult to render because it forces the appellate court to predict the nature
of a future proceeding which will depend, at least in part, on the strategic
and tactical choices of the litigants. As a result of these concerns, the only
absolute dictate of the Seventh Circuit's remand order'in MCI was that any
new MCI lost-profits study must include foundations for its assumptions
and must make adjustments for losses flowing from competition which was'
found to be lawful.' 66
Apart from this command, the Seventh Circuit's guidelines for the damages
trial consisted of broad suggestions subject to the discretion of the trial judge.
This approach was made possible by the court's decision to remand the case
to District Judge John Grady, who had acquired the familiarity necessary
to apply such broad rules because of his experience in presiding over the
original trial.' 6 7 The Seventh.Circuit recommended greatly limiting further
163. Examples of cases in which the court remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages
are Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964); Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y
of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc., 635 F.2d 118, 128-31 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982);
Franklin Music Co. v. American Broadcasting Co., 616 F.2d 528, 538 (3d Cir. 1979); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1093 (1980); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1975);
Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 47-8 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929
(1975); Household Goods Carriers' Bureau v. Terrell, 452 F.2d 152, 159-61 (5th Cir. 1971),
after remand, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 987 (1974). Cases in which
the court ordered that the trial be bifurcated into a "liability" stage and a "damages" stage
include In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 174, 178-79 (D.D.C. 1980); LoCicero
v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 52 F.R.D. 28, 29-30 (E.D. La. 1971). But see Response of Carolina,
Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976) (urging caution in the utilization
of bifurcated trials in antitrust cases because of the potential for confusion between the deter-
mination of fact of injury in the liability phase and the determination of the amount of damages
in the damages phase).
164. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) (facts concerning
liability interwoven with facts concerning damages might lead to juror confusion resulting in
denial of a fair trial).
165. See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1167-68.
166. Id. at 1168.
167. Id. at 1174. The court declined to apply Circuit Rule 18, which requires reassignment
of a case after reversal and remand, so that Judge Grady could continue to preside over the case.
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discovery, barring the relitigation of prior evidentiary rulings, and relying
on stipulations to educate the jury on the liability issues of the case. 68 Finally,
the court suggested the utilization of a special master to determine technical
issues relating to the calculation of lost profits.'69
Although the ultimate timing and structure of the further proceeding re-
main to be determined, there has already been great speculation as to the
outcome of the case on remand. The Seventh Circuit's opinion, as well as
public reaction and speculation as to the outcome on remand, have been
widely reported.' 70 Interestingly, both parties claimed vindication by the
Seventh Circuit's decision. MCI claimed victory in the court's affirmation
of AT&T's liability on most of the antitrust charges, and suggested that
it would ultimately receive damages of equivalent magnitude as had been
previously awarded. 7' AT&T, on the other hand, claimed victory in the over-
turning of the $1.8 billion award, which with interest from the date of judg-
ment had grown to over $2 billion.'" In addition, AT&T regarded the resolu-
tion of the predatory pricing claims in its favor as the dismissal of the prin-
cipal allegation, thus eliminating the preponderance of damages that could
be assessed against it on remand.' 3
Following the MCI decision, William McGowan, the president of MCI,
stated that the spectacular post-1975 profitability of his company suggested
that MCI could have earned even more but for AT&T's illegal interference.'7 4
On this basis, McGowan predicted that MCI would receive on remand
damages at least as great as those awarded at the original trial.' 75 McGowan's
bold assertion, however, is implausible. The majority opinion rejected the
original lost-profits study offered by MCI as untrustworthy and as based
upon unreasonable assumptions not supported by the record.' 76 The opinion
168. Id. at 1168-69.
169. Id. at 1169 n.122. This suggestion was heavily qualified by the court's repeated statements
that the matter was entirely within the discretion of the district court. Id. This delicate ap-
proach appears appropriate given the inherent conflicts between a special master and the fact
finder, see FED. R. Civ. P. 53, and the potential for great delay in adding another level
to the proceeding. See Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1020 (1971).
170. See, e.g., Marbach, Ma & Ipsen, Ma Bell's Antitrust Troubles, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24,
1983, at 55, col. 2; Carley, Ruling in AT&T-MCI Case Indicates Courts Confusion on Predatory
Pricing, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1983, at 7, col. 1; Ackland, Who Won AT&T-MCI Suit Not
Clear as a Bell, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 16, 1983, § 5, at 5, col. 2; Crawford & Ackland, AT&T
Antitrust Penalty Overturned, Chi. Tribune, Jan. 13, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 1; Possley, $1.8
Billion Award Against AT&T Voided, Chi. Sun-Times, Jan. 13, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Richards
& Williams, Court Remands AT&T Verdict of $1.8 Billion, Wall St. J., Jan, 13, 1983, at
2, cob. 2; Yates, AT&T Ruling May Yet be Appealed, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Jan. 13, 1983,
at I, cot. 2; Bell Wins Plea to Block Award of $1.8 Billion, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1983, at
1, col. 5.
171. Marbach, Ma & lpsen, supra note 170, at 55, cob. 2.
172. Yates, supra note 170, at 1, col. 2.
173. Id. at 1, co. 5.
174. Marbach, Ma & lpsen, supra note 170, at 55, co. 3.
175. Id.
176. MCI, 708 F.2d at 1164-65.
19831
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
specifically noted that the study did not take into account the fact that Telpak
and Hi-Lo were perfectly lawful practices.' Since the predatory pricing
charges were central to MCI's case, its new damage evidence will have to
project MCI's anticipated revenues in light of an AT&T pricing plan which
MCI itself regarded as an insurmountable obstacle to its success.' 8 The
lawfulness of Telpak and Hi-Lo casts grave doubt on MCI's ability to earn
the eighty-five cents per circuit mile it had originally projected in its lost-
profits study.'79 Thus, if MCI presents a revised lost-profits study on re-
mand, it seems likely that its projected revenue, and hence its lost profits,
will have to be reduced significantly to be acceptable under the guidelines
suggested by the Seventh Circuit.
McGowan's brash prediction fails for one additional reason. The bulk of
MCI's profitability has come from the provision of Execunet, a residential
long-distance telephone service which did not come into existence until 1977.' 8o
The success MCI has enjoyed through Execunet is irrelevant to the calcula-
tion of damages in a case which concerns only private line business telecom-
munications prior to 1975.181 The Seventh Circuit specifically noted that it
was improper for MCI to include revenues from Execunet service in the
revenue assumptions in its lost-profits study.'82 The court concluded that
the jury thus had no rational basis for finding that, without Execunet, MCI
could have earned the revenues it had assumed it could have earned in the
absence of AT&T's unlawful acts.'83 In sum, while the initial verdict in MCI's
favor was of astonishing magnitude, the size of the ultimate award on re-
mand should attract little attention.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has examined the principal legal arguments raised in both the
majority and the dissenting opinions in a case which has elicited considerable
controversy over both its decision and the reasons given in support of that
decision. If the Seventh Circuit is unable to speak with an entirely unified
voice on the use and potential abuse of monopoly power, and how to assess
a monetary penalty for such conduct, the court can take comfort in the
fact that these issues continue to divide virtually all courts and commen-
tators considering these questions. These irreconcilable divisions stem from
177. Id. at 1161-64.
178. See Brief for Appellant at 171-72, MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
-179. See 708 F.2d at 1164-66. This was the revenue figure MCI assumed it earned per month
for each circuit mile. Total monthly revenues were derived by multiplying this $.85 figure by
the size -of MCI's system, which was assumed to be 37 million circuit miles. Id.
180. Execunet was first authorized by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
181. 708 F.2d at 1195 app. (setting forth the jury instructions).
182. Id. at 1166-207.
183. Id.
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fundamental differences regarding the proper regulation of monopoly power.
The time has come for the Supreme Court to speak on the proper standards
for judging predatory pricing, and other allegations under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, lest the jurisprudence of antitrust drift off in increasingly
divergent and mutually exclusive directions.' 84
184. Prior to the publication of this article, the United States Supreme Court declined to
review the Seventh Circuit's opinion in MCI. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3280 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1983)
(Nos. 83-21, 83-32, 83-217).

